Klooster, The Incomprehensibility of God in the Orthodox Presbyterian Conflict (Franeker: T. Clark on the matter of God’s incomprehensibility at his ordination examination. Stonehouse, and apologist Cornelius Van Til argued that there is such a radical difference, challenging Gordon H. Reformed theologians, John Murray and Ned B.
Lucas, The Freedom of the Will (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970), p. The counterexample is supplied by Norman Kretzmann. This particular locution is attributed to Elizabeth Anscombe by Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. See Eleanore Stump’s and Norman Kretzmann’s article, ‘Eternity’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. A very different rendering would be required if the theist were to hold that God is omniscient and atemporally eternal. Here, I am assuming that the omniscient being is within time even though he might be eternal. Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. Richard La Croix, ‘The Impossibility of Defining Omnipotence,’ Philosophical Studies, Vol. Morris Engel, With Good Reason (New York: St. Richard La Croix argues that it is a concept that is impossible to define, in ‘The Impossibility of Defining Omnipotence,’ Philosophical Studies, Vol. If we say ‘No,’ then we are admitting that there are things that God cannot do. The paradox is started by the question, Can God make things he cannot then control? If we say ‘Yes,’ then once he has made them he is not omnipotent. In this context, Plantinga addresses the ‘omnipotence paradox’ introduced by J. 3.Īlvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. Quine, Methods of Logic (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1950), p. 8f, andĪnthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 95–110.įor a helpful discussion of this doctrine see Plantinga’s Does God Have a Nature? pp. See Alvin Plantinga’s, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).įor a helpful discussion of this doctrine see Plantinga’s Does God Have a Nature? pp. Ahern, The Problem of Evil (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1971), p.
William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. If he is not perfectly good in some straightforward sense, then he may have it in his power to act and know of every instance of evil in the world, but he may not remove every evil because it is not according to his desire to do so. Or, God may possess the power and desire to remove all evil from the world, but if he does not have omniscience in a significant way, he may fail to remove every manifestation of evil in the world because he may not be cognizant of every evil. If God is not omnipotent in some sense, then although he might know of every occurrence of evil in the world and desire to remove them all because he is perfectly good, his lack of power might stand in the way of his doing so.
After all, isn’t the existence of evil incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God? If the attack has bite, a central reason is the fact that the theist holds that all three predicates are central to the nature of God. 2 One of the main atheological attacks based on evil is against the theist qua theist. 1 Philosophical interest in the divine attributes is due in part to the role the omni-attributes have in theodicy formulations. Currently, one could probably learn more about the attributes of God from philosophers of religion than from Christian theologians.
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